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iz,3:t",.  '"ritEFACE  This  report  provides  summaries  of  the  papers  and  discussions  at
the  third  Consortium  on  Trade  Research  held  in  Washington,  D.C.,
June  23-24,  1981.  The  cochairmen  of  the  consortium  were
T.  Kelley  White,  Economic Research Service  (ERS),  George  E.
Rossmiller,  Foreign Agricultural Service  (FAS),  and  Vernon
Sorenson, Michigan State University.
The  Consortium  focused  on  world  demand  for  agricultural  imports
and the  policies and conditions  in low-income,  middle-income,
and centrally planned countries that  influence  import  demand.
An overview paper by Dewain Rahe and  Cheryl  Christensen  assessed
future global prospects for agricultural  trade.  Peter  Timmer's
paper investigated conceptual and empirical  problems  in  analyz-
ing import demand.  Three  of  the papers  discussed  the  demand
for food and agricultural products in  the  Soviet  Union  and
China.  Three additional  papers focused  on  factors  affecting
import demand in low- and middle-income countries.  A final  set
of  papers examined  the role  of  bilateral  agreements  and  stock-
holding policies  in agricultural trade.
Copies of  the papers,  as presented  at  the consortium or  in  their
final  published  form,  are  available  from  the  authors  on  request.
The preparation of  this  summary report was coordinated  by
Charles E.  Hanrahan, ERS,  and  George E. Rossmiller.  Summaries
of  the  papers  and the discussants'  comments  were prepared  from
materials  submitted by the  contributors.  Alan Webb,  Trade
Policy Branch,  ERS,  and John  Dyck,  Asia Branch,  ERS,  assisted in
the preparation  of  the  proceedings.FOREWORD  The seventies  brought about major changes  in  the  pattern  and
structure  of world agricultural trade  and  U.S.  interests  in  that
trade.  These changes pose new challenges  for  U.S.  agriculture.
The  Economic  Research  Service  (ERS)  has  a  major  role  to  play,
notably in research and  country analysis,  in  meeting  these
challenges.  In  doing  so,  it  must  work  closely  with  other
agencies in USDA and with university researchers.
The goal  of  increased interaction between  ERS  and  university
researchers was realized  in June 1980 by establishing the
Consortium  on  Trade  Research.  USDA's  Foreign  Agricultural
Service (FAS) joined  the Consortium in  1982.  The  objectives
of  the  Consortium  are  to:
o  Foster sustained efforts in international  trade
research  which  emphasize  domestic  impacts  of
policy developments in international  commodity
markets.
o  Encourage and  facilitate interaction between ERS,
FAS,  and  university  trade  policy  researchers.
o  Provide  a  forum  for  the  exchange  of  research  results
and  the  identification  of  problems  and  policy  issues
requiring  research.
The Consortium is a cooperative undertaking between  ERS,
FAS,  and  various  universities.  Membership  in  the  Consortium
is mutually agreed upon by ERS, FAS,  and  initial university
participants  but  is  generally  open  to  those  who  have  an
interest  and are prepared to make a  contribution.
JOHN E.  LEE,  Jr.
Administrator
Economic  Research  Service
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iiiHIGHLIGHTS  Most of  the growth in world demand for  agricultural  imports  i
the seventies occurred  in the middle-income  developing  countra
and  the centrally planned countries.  These  markets  have  also
been major sources  of  expanded U.S. agricultural  exports  during
the seventies and  early eighties.  The  third  Consortium  on  Trade
Research, conducted by USDA's Economic Research  Service and
Foreign Agricultural  Service and several  universities,  focused
on the global and national policies and economic conditions
that affect world demand for agricultural  commodities.
Agricultural import demand depends primarily  on  rates  of  growth
of  income  and population.  Both grew  rapidly  in  the  seventies.
Future growth in demand will be especially  sensitive  to  world
economic  growth, which  is assumed to  slow  in  the  eighties.
Variation in estimates  of import demand  during  the  eighties
depends on one's assumptions about the  pace  at  which  income
and population will grow.  Nevertheless, U.S.  agricultural
exports will continue  to  increase during  the  eighties.
Population, income, and prices  help determine  grain  imports.
Grain imports are also  the  result  of  decisions  of  government
policymakers  in importing countries.  Thus,  economists  need  to
place the analysis  of  food imports in  the  context  of  a
political economy.
Several  of  the Consortium papers examined  the  specifics  of  agr
cultural import demand in major economic  groupings  of  countri
The role  of  USSR state  trading and the  effects  of  China's  domes-
tic policy on food imports were examined.  Because  of  its  size
and  the secrecy with which  it  deals  in  world  markets,  the  Soviet
Union is  able  to manipulate the world  grain  market  and  obtain
favorable terms.  China's food imports  have  grown  rapidly
since 1977;  they are a direct result  of  domestic  policy  deci-
sions  to  improve  the standard  of  living  and  to  provide  material
incentives  for productivity increases.
While internal political  decisions weigh heavily  in the decision
to import  food in China and the  Soviet  Union, more conventional
economic variables  explain the variation in import demand  in
the middle-income developing countries.  Evidence was  offered
that foreign exchange  earnings, population growth, and  the
level  of  production  and  stocks  are  the  factors  that  affect
grain  imports  in  these  countries.
Trade  and  domestic  policies  affecting  import  demand  include
bilateral  agreements  and  domestic  stockholding.  Bilateral
agreements  tend  to  increase  price  instability,  especially  for
nonparticipants  in  the  agreement,  and  are  used  more  by  small
countries  than  large.  Stockholding  by  importing  countries  may
affect  import  demand  through  its  impact  on  prices.  Evidence
was  offered  that  few  importing  countries  should use  inter-
year  stockholding  rather  than  imports  to  stabilize  their  grain
consumption.
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Developments  during  the  seventies triggered  widespread  concern
about  the  ability of  the world to  produce  enough  food  to  meet
the  increased  demand  generated  by  the  continued  rapid  growth  in
population and  income.  The  seventies were  a  transition  period
as  global  agriculture moved from a  surplus  position,  especially
for grains,  to  a tightened  supply situation  accompanied  by
generally  declining  real  prices  in  agricultural  products.
Economic Research Service baseline projections  to  1985/86
suggest  the mideighties will  be a period  of  serious  adjustment
for world and U.S. agriculture  as  demand  is  expected  to  grow
faster than supplies  in most major regions.
Supply  forecasts  are  based  on  1960-80  area  and  yield  trends
and  a  review  of  land  constraints  and  productivity  factors  that
might  accelerate  or  slow  trend  growth  rates.  Demand  forecasts
are based on population and income  growth  rates,  expectations
regarding  changes  in  taste,  grain  and  oilmeal  livestock-feed
conversion  rates,  and  our  notion  of  the  changing  demand  for
stocks.  Demand  for  U.S.  exports  is  calculated  as  the  differ-
ence between  the projected foreign supply and demand.
World economic activity  is  assumed to  slow significantly in
the  early  eighties.  The  mix  of  increasingly  severe  inflation
and  unemployment  problems  reported  in  most  of  the  developed
and  developing  countries  will  be  the  likely  cause  of  the
slowdown.  Longer  range  problems--such  as  short  supplies  and
rising prices  for key inputs;  the transition to  alternate,
generally higher  cost energy  sources;  and slowed labor and
capital  productivity  growth--are  assumed  to  worsen  and  extend
what would otherwise  be  a  short-lived slowdown.
The results  of  this  study suggest  that  the  value of  U.S.  agri-
cultural exports  is  likely  to  increase slightly more than 10
percent  per year in the early eighties.  By 1985/86,  U.S.
agricultural  exports  could  reach  almost  $75  billion,  up  from
$40 billion in 1979/80.  Higher prices  will account  for much ofthis growth, and U.S.  export volume  is  expected  to  increase,
but  the  expansion  may  be  limited  by  production  capacity.
Foreign  coarse  grain  production  is  expected  to  increase  about
2.4 percent annually, or at  about  the  growth  rate  of  the  seven-
ties.  Foreign  demand  for  coarse  grains,  however,  is  likely  to
increase  about  3  percent  per  year  as  demand  for  grain-fed
livestock  products  accelerates.  Hence,  import  demand  for  U.S.
corn and sorghum should increase significantly, 4  to 5 percent
per  year  to  about  90  million  tons  by  1985/86.
Foreign  production  of  wheat  is  likely  to  increase  at  about  2.2
percent  per  year  through  the  mideighties.  Marginally  stronger
gains  in  consumption  should  keep  demand  for  U.S.  wheat  growing
at more than 2 percent per year.  Growth  in  consumption  in  the
developing countries should be substantially  faster  than  growth
in  production;  imports  are  forecast  to  increase  several  million
tons  per year.  The centrally planned countries,  however,  are
likely  to  import  considerably less wheat  in  the  eighties  as  their
crops  recover  from  the  weather-related  shortfalls  of  the  late
seventies.  Little  change  is  expected  in  the  developed  countries'
trend  toward  greater  wheat  self-sufficiency.
Foreign  oilseed output  is forecast  to  increase  4  to  5  percent
per  year  through  1985/86;  Brazil,  Argentina,  China,  and  India
are expected to  account for most of  this  growth.  Much  of  the
South  American  increase  will  be  used  domestically  to  support
expanding  livestock  industries.  Demand  for  meals  elsewhere  in
the world may increase 1 to  4 percent faster  than  production
and  generate  large  increases  in  demand  for  U.S.  exports.
Exports  of  meal  and  the  meal  equivalent  of  bean  exports  could
reach  almost  28  million  tons  by  1985/86,  compared  with  21
million  tons  in  the  late  seventies.
Cotton  production  outside  the  United  States  is  expected  to  in-
crease by  slightly less  than 2 percent annually.  Use  is  fore-
cast  to  increase  at  nearly  the  same  rate,  primarily  due  to
income  and  population  growth  in  the  developing  countries,
including  China,  and  expansion  in  textile  exports  from  several
Asian  countries.  Higher  prices  for  petroleum-based  synthetics
will  also  tend  to  encourage  cotton  consumption.  Little  in-
crease in use is  expected in the  developing countries.  With
roughly  equal  rates  of  growth  in  foreign  supply  and  demand,
U.S.  cotton  exports  are  expected  to  average  about  7  million
bales  per  year  over  the  first  half  of  the  eighties,  up  from
about  6  million  in  the  late  seventies  but  down  from  the  excep-
tionally  high  level  in  1979/80.
Prospects  for  continued  growth  in  U.S.  agricultural  exports  of
4  to  6  percent  in  volume  annually  have  serious  implications
for  American  agriculture.  There  will  be  potential  problems  it
developing  new  resources,  maintaining  or  increasing  productiv
ity,  and  market  stabilizing  activities.  The  best  land  resources
are  already  committed  to  agricultural  production,  and  we  do
not  have  50  to  60  million  idle  acres  in  reserve  as  at  the
beginning  of  the  seventies.  All-out  production  may  occur  atthe expense of  acceptable conservation practices.  Increased
costs  of  inputs,  especially  fertilizer  and  pesticides,  will
make  it more difficult  to achieve sustained  growth  in  yields.
The  variability  of  foreign  production is  likely  to  increase  as
more marginal  land  is brought  into production,  and  this  could
have  a  serious  price  impact  on  domestic  agriculture--especially
the  livestock producers.  If  real prices  of  grains  and  oilseeds
increase,  many  small  operators  will  be  encouraged  to  specialize
in crop production at  the  expense of  livestock  production.
Transportation  capacity  may  limit  the  expansion  of  exports  in
the  next  decade.  The  deterioration  of  the  rail  system  and
increased  competition  from  the  prospects  of  sharply  increased
coal exports will have  to be  addressed during  the  eighties  if
exports  are  to  meet  the  expected  foreign  demand.
The ERS baseline  is  one of  several  attempts  to  project  the
global  supply-demand  balance  and  the  structure  of  agricultural
trade.  Comparing the baseline with other  projections  is  useful
for  several  reasons.  Comparisons  can  suggest  a  range  of  re-
sults based on different  but plausible assumptions  about  key
variables.  Also  comparisons  between  the  baseline  and  other
projections can provide a basis for thinking  about  the  dura-
bility  of  identified  trends.  Comparing  medium-term  projections
with  longer  term  results  can  suggest  limitations  on  identified
trends.  While  longer  term  comparisons  were  made  in  the  paper,
the  summary  deals  primarily  with  comparisons  of  projections  to
1985.
Six projections  of the global food situation  in  1985  were
reviewed  and  compared  with  the  USDA  baseline:
o  FAO, Agricultural Commodity Projections  1975-85  (FAO),
Rome,  1979.
o  USDA, ERS, The World Food Situation and Prospects  to
1985  (WFS), FAER No.  98, December  1974.
o  Leroy  Blakeslee,  Earl  Heady  and  Charles  Farmingham,
World  Food  Production,  Demand,  and  Trade  (ISU),  Ames,
Iowa  State  University  Press,  1973.
o  University  of  California  Task  Force  Report,  A  Hungry
World:  The Challenge to Agriculture  (UC),  Berkeley,
University  of  California,  1974.
o  International  Food  Policy  Research  Institute,  Meeting
Food  Needs  in  the  Developing  World:  The  Location  and
Magnitude of  the Problem  (IFPRI),  Washington, D.C.,
1976.
o  The Global 2000 Report to the President  (G2000),
Washington,  D.C.,  GPO,  1980.
The  studies  presented  a  wide  range  of  estimates  of  global  cereal
production  and  demand.  Projections  of  1985  global  cerealproduction and  demand range from 1.2 billion  tons  to  1.7
billion.  The older studies'  (Heady, University of  California)
projections  of  cereal  production were below the actual  1980/81
production.  The range for cereal demand is even larger  at  631
million tons.  However, while at  least half  of  the  evaluated
projections  implied relatively low levels  of  production (in
relation to  1980/81), virtually all  of  them indicated much
higher global  cereal demand.  The strong convergence  of  demand
projections  toward high growth,  coupled with much less  conver-
gence  of  production projections, lends  support  to those who
hypothesize tightening  markets and  increasing  instability.
There is much more convergence on global  production-demand
estimates  than on  the  structure of  trade.  Projections  of  the
cereal  import demand for developing regions  (Asia, Africa, and
Latin America) tend  to  be polarized,  some  forecasting a  major
expansion of  import  requirements and  others  projecting imports
near or below 1980/81  levels.  The main reason  for  the differ-
ences is that  import demand in the  short  run is  very sensitive
to  assumptions  about income  growth;  the USDA baseline more
fully captures-the effects  of  increased oil revenue  in major
OPEC countries.  There is also wide variation in estimates
of  the  cereal import  demand  of  the  planned economies.  Again,
the USDA baseline yields  the highest projection,  but the
projection (like all others)  is still  below the actual 1980/81
import level.
These  comparisons suggest  several  conclusions.  First,  the USDA
baseline tends  to  show higher import  demand in  the  developed
market economies  (DME) and  centrally planned economies  (CPE),
primarily because  of  its  economic assumptions.  Second,  all
projection exercises have difficulty  anticipating (and  fre-
quently interpreting) striking deviations  from trend.
The comparisons  raise some basic substantive  questions.  If
income trends  changed,  would there be  a  major  impact  on food
imports,  or would policies  to protect  consumption moderate  the
impact?  Second,  how should the  high  import  demand for  the
planned economies  be  interpreted--as  an unusual  (unsustainable)
event or a basic feature  of  the  structure  of global  grain trade?
The  comparisons raise  conceptual  issues  as well.  The rapid
changes  during the seventies  placed a premium on being able to
generate a range  of  projections  of  foreign supply, demand,  and trade potential.  Forecasts must  be  capable of  revision as  con-
ditions  change  to  be  useful  to  policymakers.  Ideally,  proj ec-
tions  would  be  contingent  and  defined  by  alternative  scenarios
or  more  general  sensitivity  analysis.  This method has weak-
nesses,  however.  When  change was  genuinely unanticipated  (for
example, a  major policy reversal, a major redistribution of
income, the construction  of new policies which made  imports
insensitive),  scenarios which were able to  forecast  the impli
cations  of  such  changes were not  forthcoming.  Relatively
mechanical adjustments  of key variables  (for example, income
growth)  will  not  easily  generate  scenarios  which  show  the
impact  of  such  changes.  Hence,  while  projections  produce  arange  of  results,  the  range  is  hard  to  interpret.  Under  these
conditions,  short-  to  medium-term  forecasting  will  tend  to
"absorb"  changes,  leading  to  updates  which  differ  only  margin-
ally  from  the  previous  update.  As  a  result,  it  becomes  more
difficult  to  demonstrate  to  those  using  forecasts  the  magnitude
of  the  changes  incorporated  into  them,  or  the  possibility  for
similarly  large  changes  being  incorporated  piecemeal  in  the
future.
Comments  by  Ralph  Lattimore:  Rahe  and  Christensen  have  com-
pared  global  medium-term  projections  of  agricultural  production,
consumption, and  trade with a recent  USDA  baseline  forecast.
The  conclusions  of  these  studies  are,  in  turn,  measured  against
some  long-term  projections.
The  usefulness  of  this  exercise  is  without  question.  A  major
lesson  the  profession  ought  to  have  learned  from  the  decade  of
the seventies  is  that  consensus or composite  forecasts  are  al-
ways more useful than individual studies.  Consensus  forecasts
are more useful  in the  sense  that  they  are  usually  more  accu-
rate.  They  are  also  more  useful  in  bringing  together  a  broader
perspective  of  the  factors  likely  to  impinge  on  the  future
market  outcome.
There  is  one  area--the  future  trend  in  real  prices--where  the
studies  diverge  rather  widely,  and  unfortunately,  this  compara-
tive  study  does  not  clarify  the  issue.  The  baseline  projection
draws  upon  results  of  annual  econometric  models  in  which  nominal
agricultural  prices  are  used;  whereas  studies  such  as  Global
2000  rest  on  models  such  as  the  USDA  Grain-Oilseed-Livestock
(GOL) model which is denominated in  real  prices.  When  price
projections  from  such  models  are  compared,  they  often  differ
widely,  even  when the quantity  (supply,  demand,  trade,  and
stocks)  scenarios  are  comparable.  The  fault  probably  lies  with
both  types  of  models.  Many  annual  econometric  models  appear
tied  to  the  money  illusion.  Considerable  care  is  usually
taken  to  ensure  that  the  domestic  portion  of  the  model  is  con-
sistent  in  this  respect  (for  example,  homogeneity  is  assured
with  respect  to  domestic  supply  and  demand)  but  not  the
export-import  sector.  This  may  be  a  serious  omission  for
commodities  like  wheat  or  coarse  grains  where  market  influences
on the  price  level are  crucial.
On  the  other  hand,  longer  term  structural  models  of  the  GOL
type  appear  to  be  too  strongly  influenced  by  the  recent  past.
That  is,  if  one  examines  the  real  price  trend  scenarios  from
studies  done  during  the  seventies,  there  appears  to  be  a  high
correlation between that  trend  and  the  actual trend  of  the
10-year  period  immediately  preceding  the  forecast.  Post-World
War  II  data,  truncated  in  1975/76,  exhibit  an  upward  real  price
trend  for  major  agricultural  commodities,  and  studies  like
Global  2000  reflect  that  trend.  However,  taken  as  a  whole,
it  is  clear  that  real  price  movements  over  the  seventies  have
preserved  the  downward  trend  that  they  have  exhibited  for  the




by  C.  Peter  Timmer
and  Robert  Schwartz
Discussant:
Andrew  Schmitz
the  extremely  bullish medium-term  market  outlook  currently
being  portrayed  for  grain  producers.
A  second point relates  to  the credibility  of  the  supply  fore-
casts  of  the  various  studies  quoted.  In  many  of  the  studies,
the  production  projections  amount  to  little  more  than  trend
extrapolation.  A  great  deal  more  is  now  known  about  technical
progress,  about  investment  in  the  supply  resource  base,  and
about  producer  incentives  and  their  relationship  through  policy
to  world  prices but  these  areas  are  seldom  addressed  adequately
in  global  forecasting  work.  Furthermore,  we  are  keenly  aware
of  the  cyclical  behavior  of  livestock  supply  and  of  wide  short-
term  fluctuations  in  exogenous  factors  (weather,  income,  inter-
est  rates,  exchange  rates,  and  political  factors).  Yet,  with
few  exceptions,  we  persist  in  presenting  point  forecasts  of
monotonic  trend  lines.  I  think  we  presume  too  much  in  assuming
that  noneconomists  (and  nonmodeling  economists)  will  understand
the  forecast  context  within  which  the  projections  are  made.
More  attention  needs  to  be  paid  to  a  format  for  presenting  pro-
jection  results  reflecting  cyclical  tendencies  and  reliable
statistics.
General  discussion:  Pearson  and  Sorenson  asked  about  recommen-
dations  for  future  projections  work.  Christensen  suggested
that forecasts need  to  be  explicitly contingent  on  key  assump-
tions built  into  the  model,  and  that  there  is  more  to  gain  by
building  models  with  links  to  other  sectors  of  the  economy
than  by  building  more  sophisticated  single  sector  agricultural
models.  Desai  felt  that  the  baseline  projections  needed  to
recognize  the  difference  between  the  food  use  and  feed  use  of
grains.  This  difference  is  extremely  important  for  determining
the  volatility  of  demand  and  the  size  and  structure  of  buffer
stock  programs.  Rahe  pointed  out  that  the  baseline  looked
only  at  food  grains  and  was  a  point  of  departure  for  further
analysis,  and  not  the  final  result.
Grain  imports  are  not  a  direct  function  of  prices,  but  the  re-
sult  of  policy  decisions  based  on  the  objectives  and  constraints
of  government  policymakers  in  importing  countries.  Explanations
of  grain imports  are found  in an examination  of  the  domestic
political  and  policy  framework  of  each  country's  food  economy.
There  are  three  major  sections  in  the  paper.  The  first  section
examines  the  workings  of  the  grain-marketing  system  with  partic-
ular  attention  to  the  linkages  across  commodities  and  across
end  uses  and  the  forces  of  change  at  work  within  the  system.
This  section  provides  a  way  of  looking  at  the  world  food  system,
which  allows  us  to  understand  where  the  linkages  are,  where
they  might  be  strengthened,  and  the  ramifications  of  strengthen-
ing  them.
The  second  section  provides  a  theoretical  foundation  for  the
discussion  of  microeconomic  and  macroeconomic  linkages.  This
section  is  an  attempt  to  understand  some  of  the  new  macroeco-
nomic  literature  that  is  concerned  about  microfoundations  of
macroeconometric  models,  the  role  of  rational  expectations,and the  role  of money.  Much of  the new macroeconomic theory
addresses, at  a  methodological  level,  the  problems  encountered
in the global macromodels  for estimating  grain  imports.  This
section  links  macrodemand  patterns  and  microproduction  patterns
through markets and price formation up  to  the  macroeconomic
linkages.
The  third  and  final  section  is  on  political  economy,  emphasiz-
ing that  farmers  will  produce  more  if  prices  of  their  output  are
raised,  but  consumers,  particularly,  very  poor  consumers,  will
consume  less.  Most  Asian  countries  have  chosen  to  deal  with
this dilemma  with a  wide  variety  of  interventions  from  input
subsidies  to  market  subsidies  and  dual  price  shops.  In  almost
all  cases there are direct or  indirect grain import  ramifica-
tions.  Hence,  food  imports  are  directly  affected  by  the  mech-
anisms by which countries come  to grips  with  their  basic  politi-
cal  economy  problems  with  respect  to  food.  That  is  why  imports
are  a  policy variable  in  a  general  equilibrium  model.
This  suggests  that  imports  are  exogenous  from  an  economist's
point of  view.  This may be true  in the  very  short  run.  In  the
longer  run, foreign  exchange  constraints,  changes  in  the  money
supply, expenditures on other  items  in the budget, among other
factors,  have  economic  ramifications  for  the  decision  to  import
grains.
This paper provides  a perspective on  how  we  view  grain  imports:
o  At  the microlevel  more  disaggregation  is  needed.  The
production side  poses no major  problems,  but  the  study
of  variation  in  demand  patterns  needs  more  work.
o  There is  a need to  join in the  work  and  debate  of
macroeconomic  theorists  who  are  trying  to  understand
the  role  of  expectations,  the  role  of  money,  and  the
linkages  between  the  macroeconomic  and  microeconomic
sectors.
o  These  two  sectors  must  be  put  together  in  a  political
economy  framework  which  looks  at  the  objectives  and
the  constraints facing  policymakers in  the grain
import  decisionmaking  process.
Comments  by  Andrew  Schmitz:  The  paper  by  Timmer  and  Schwartz
discusses  an  important  subject  area,  that  is,  estimating  import
demand  functions  generally  and  U.S.  products  specifically.  Two
crucial  issues  remain.  Should  one  estimate  import  functions
directly  or  estimate  domestic  demand  and  supply  functions  and
derive  the  excess  demand  equations  from  these?  And,  given  lim-
ited  budgets,  should  detailed  analysis  be  done  on  individual
countries  or  should  the  focus  be  on  an  aggregate  basis?  In
terms  of  the  former  issue,  research  should  be  done  which  takes
a  particular  problem  and  estimates  functions  using  both
approaches.  This  would  allow  one  to  determine  how  sensitive
the  results  are  to  equation  specification.  Concerning  the
latter  issue,  both  approaches  are  needed.  However,  relativelymore emphasis  should be  placed on  the aggregate approach  since
most trade policy analysis requires  more  than knowledge  of
detailed  import  functions for one or  two countries.
Current  research on estimating  import  demand functions  is
encouraging because of data availability.  Since the  early
seventies,  prices and quantities have moved sufficiently in
different  directions  so  as  to  give  a  regression  surface  capable
of  being  estimated.
Timmer responded by making two points, neither of  which had
been  dealt  with  in  the  paper.  First,  the  paper  did  not  have  a
literature review of a discussion of  grain import  functions.
Even  if  there  had  been  time  to  do  it,  according  to  Timmer,  it
wouldn't make  sense  to  estimate import  demand functions  directly
for many of  these countries.  A political  economy methodology
had to  be used  as  a  starting point rather than  the methods
developed  in existing  literature.  The  second point  not dealt
with in the  paper was demand  estimation.  Another paper  goes
into greater depth on this  subject.
General discussion:  Lattimore  asked  to what extent additional
food aid and a  food insurance  scheme were  substitutes  for  one
another.  Timmer observed  that the  two  policies  spoke  to differ-
ent issues.  Food aid is concerned  with the general  level  of
nutrition in developing countries, whereas  food  insurance  is
designed to handle problems  associated  with  food  shortages  and
production variabilities.  It was Timmer's  judgement that
most countries would  choose  food aid  if given  the  choice.
In  response to  a  question on how to  estimate world aggregate
demand,  Timmer said that once  a major policy  shift  becomes
apparent, the  impact on demand  is  predictable.  For  example,
once  it was clear that  the  Organization  of  Petroleum Exporting
Countries  (OPEC) would be successful in  increasing the  price
of  oil,  the  effect on demand was  completely  predictable.
Robert Schwartz  added  that  predicting  political decisions will
be critical  to  accurate  estimation  of aggregate  demand in  the
coming  decade.  Determining  the  impact  of  internal  forces on
the  political decisionmaking process will  be  the key element
in  this effort.  Schwartz  said more resources will have  to  be
devoted  to understanding the  political decision  process.
Andrew Schmitz  asked whether one  could  include  this decision
process  in a model  of  a centrally  planned economy such as  the
Soviet Union and,  if  so,  how would it be done.  Timmer felt  it
was  possible,•  at  least  for China.  It would be necessary  to put
together  the microside  of  the  Chinese agricultural economy and
simulate  future growth  to  see where tensions will  develop.
This  information  can  be  fed  into  the macrosector  to  obtain  a
notion  of  the  pressures  confronting  Chinese  policymakers.
This method will allow researchers to  understand the choices
confronting decisionmakers,  but  it won'  t predict  how they will
respond.Sorensen questioned  Timmer's contention  that the pattern of
food consumption by income groups is  the  same  around  the  world.
Sorensen felt  that food consumption by  similar  income  groups
differed  substantially  in  Asia,  Africa,  and  Latin  America.
Timmer agreed, but  stated  that  in a broader  sense  the  same basic
pattern  emerges.  As  people's  incomes  rise,  their  food  consump-
tion gradually shifts away from grains  and  root  crops  to meats
and  poultry.  Urbanization  is  a  major  force  in  this  development.INTERNAL POLICY, DECISIONS, AND FOOD IMPORT DEMAND IN CENTRALLY PLANNED COUNTRIES
The  Impact  of
Soviet  State  Trad-
ing  on  the  Func-
tioning  of  Inter-
national Food
Markets
Joseph  C.  Brada
Discussant:
Alex McCalla
During  the  seventies,  the  Soviet  Union  became  a  large,  though
erratic,  importer  of  grain.  Because  USSR  trade  is  carried  out
by  means  of  a  state  trading  organization,  the  possibility  that
the  Soviet  Union  is  able  to  capture  an  inordinately  large  share
of  the  gains  from  its  grain  trade  with  the  United  States  has
been raised.
One  potential  source  of  advantage  for  the  Soviet  Union  is  the
ability  to  implement  administratively  the  equivalent  of  an
optimal  tariff  through  the  import  decisions  of  the  state
trading  organization.  Thus,  the  restriction  of  imports  to
improve  terms  of  trade  does  not  invite  the  type  of  retaliation
that  would  result  if  a  tariff  were  imposed  to  achieve  the  same
end.  Moreover,  even  if  a  market  economy  were  to  retaliate
with  a  tariff  of  its  own,  there  is  no  certainty  that  the  offer
curve  of  the  state  trading  country  is  such  that  the  market
economy's  welfare  would  increase  as  a  result.  This  view  of
USSR  trade  behavior  has  been  challenged  by  an  alternate  view
which  holds  that  trade  decisions  of  the  Soviet  Union  are  rela-
tively  rigid  and  that  USSR  trading  organizations  are  thus
vulnerable  to  exploitation  by  market  economies  and  unlikely  to
restrict  trade  in  order  to  improve  their  terms  of  trade.
A  second  inequity  in  the  distribution  of  trade  is  that  the
instabilities  of  USSR  grain  production  are  passed  on  to
Western  consumers  and  producers  while  Soviet  consumers  are
shielded  from  the  effects  of  these  fluctuations.
The  U.S.-USSR grain  agreement  is  evaluated  to  see  whether  and
how  it may  influence  the  ability  of  the  USSR  trading
apparatus  to  extract  excessive  gains  from  trade.  The  trade
agreement  requires  the  Soviet  Union  to  purchase  at  least  6
million  tons.  Quantities  greater  than  8  million  tons  require
government-to-government  negotiation.  If  the  Soviet  Union
were  acting  to  restrict  imports  and  improve  its  terms  of  trade,
then  the  provisions  of  the  grain  agreement  tend  to  limit  the
Soviet  Union's  ability  to  extract  excess  gains  from  trade  with
the  United  States.  Moreover,  the  provisions  also  reduce  the
ability  of  the  Soviet  Union  to  "hide"  the  true  location  of
its  offer  curve.  On  the  other  hand,  if  Soviet  trade  behavior
is  characterized  by  inflexibility,  then  the  provisions  of  the
grain  agreement  tend  to  enhance  the  ability  of  the  United
States  to  capture  a  disproportionate  share  of  the  gains.
There  is  insufficient  evidence  to  conclude  that  the  Soviet  Union
passes  all  of  its  output  instability  on  to  international  markets.
Although  production  is  unstable  while  human  consumption  has  lev-
eled  off  considerably  in  the  post-1970  period,  use  of  grain  for
animal  feed  has  continued  to  fluctuate  widely.  Moreover,  fluc-
tuations  in  USSR  import  demand  may  not  be  correlated  to  demand
fluctuations  in  other  importing  countries,  thus  stabilizing  the
world  market.
10It  appears  that  market  economies  are  able  to  trade  with  state
trading  countries  without  eliminating  market  mechanisms  by
adopting  measures  which  protect  markets  from  the  abuse  of
state trading organizations.
Comments  by  Alex  McCalla:  As  Mr.  Brada  pointed  out,  his  paper
is  far  less  ambitious  than  the  title  indicates.  His  discussion
concerns  state  trading  in  a  bilateral  framework  with  emphasis
on  the  Soviet  Union  rather  than  looking  at  state  trading  in  a
general  multilateral  context.  The  paper  identifies  two  major
reasons for  the recent  interest in state  trading  agencies:
the  contention that  state trading allows  the  Soviet  Union  to
extract  monopoly  gains,  and  that  USSR  participation  in  the
market has increased  price instability.
Brada  maintains  that  monopoly  gains  result  because  the  Soviet
Union  is  a  large  purchaser  in  the  world  grains  market  and  is
capable  of  manipulating  the  market  in  its  favor, and  because  it
can  obtain  better  terms  in  commercial  transactions  because  of
its  secrecy.  It  would  be  an  interesting  empirical  question  to
determine  whether  USSR  purchases  differ  over  the  course  of  a
year.  If  the  Soviets  anticipate  an  upward  trend  in  prices, one
would expect  them to buy early;  if  they  anticipate  a  downward
trend, purchases  would be delayed until  later  in  the  year.
The fact that Soviet participation in  the  market  has  increased
price instability is  not  necessarily  related  to  state  trading,
as  Mr.  Brada  correctly  points  out.  An  important  issue  in  this
regard  is  whether  state  trading  in  the  market  exacerbates  or
dampens  the  potential  impact  of  internal  changes  in  production.
Does  state  trading  affect  the  behavior  of  the  internal  market?
Brada  has  provided  us  with  an  interesting  and  useful  paper  as
a  bilateral  analysis  of  state  trading.  The  next  step  is  to
generalize  it  to  a  world  of  state  traders  in  which  95  percent
of  the  grain  traded  on  world  markets  is  handled  on  one  end  or
the  other  by  a  state  trader.  This  environment  is  far  different
from  that  of  the  single  state  trader  in  an  open  world  market
characterized  by  Brada.
A  number  of  questions  are  left  unanswered  about  how  state  trad-
ing  affects  the  market  in  general.  How  does  one  identify  or
characterize  an  import  demand  or  excess  supply  equation  for  a
state  trader?  Does  state  trading  as  an  institutional  framework
affect  grain  trade?
It  might  be  better  to  look  at  state  trading  within  the  context
of  the  country  and  the  world  grain  market.  State  trading  is
an  integral  means  of  instituting  domestic  policy.  As  such,  it
may  be  more  useful  to  consider  how  policy  issues  affect  the
import  demand  of  a  country  regardless  of  the  institutional
setting.
Brada  responded  that  it  would  be  a  simple  empirical  question  to
test  whether  Soviet  grain  imports  are  more  difficult  to  predict
than  imports  of  other  countries.  All  that  would  be  required
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would  be  a  comparison  of  the  performance  of  the  futures  market
in  predicting  prices  prior  to  1972  with  the  period  following
1972.  A  poorer  performance  since  1972  would  indicate  that  the
secrecy  of  Soviet  commercial  transactions  has,  in  part,  pre-
vented  the  futures  market  from  anticipating  world  grain  import
demands.
Brada  also  pointed  out  that  the  critical  issue  was  not  the
monopoly  power  of  a  state  trader  compared  with  the  rest  of  the
world's  countries--many  of  which  are  also  state  traders--but
the  implications  which  state  trading  has  for  the  domestic  mar-
ket.  How  does  a  central  purchasing  agency  affect  the  response
of  consumers  and  producers  to  changing  world  market  conditions?
General  discussion:  Lattimore  questioned  the  characterization
of  the  United  States  as  a  free  trader,  when  the  United  States
had  engaged  in  many  of  the  practices  and  policies  carried  out
by  state  traders.  Brada  agreed  that  the  United  States  had  been
guilty  of  many  of  these  practices,  but  explained  that  these
were  clearly  visible  in  U.S.  laws  and  trade  regulations.  The
policies  of  state  traders,  on  the  other  hand,  are  especially
detrimental  to  world  grain  markets  because  they  are  concealed
as  policies  of  the  trading  agency.
Andrew  Schmitz  contended  that  a  state  trading  agency  is  far
more  powerful  than  Brada  had  indicated.  He  reasoned  that  in
the  formulation  of  trade  policy,  the  government  has  only  to
maximize  the  welfare  of  the  trading  agency,  whereas  in  an  open
market  environment,  the  government  has  to  take  into  account
the welfare  of  consumers,  producers,  and  grain-trading  firms.
By  eliminating  these  other  factors  from  the  policy  formulations
process,  the  state  trader  gains  a  large  degree  of  power  and
independence.
Padma  Desai  questioned  the  role  of  the  state  trading  agency  in
keeping  Soviet  import  intentions  secret.  She  observed  that
the  Soviets  themselves  often  do  not  know  the  size  of  their  crop
or  what  their  import  needs  will  be.
The  Soviet  Union  remains  the  principal  model  for  a national
plan  that,  on  the  basis  of  commands  and  directives  from  supe-
riors, dictates  not  only  what,  when,  and  how  much  will  be  pro-
duced,  but  which  entities  in  the  economy  will  execute  the
directives.  Agricultural  production  is  based  on  consumption
norms  established  for  various  products,  input-output  analysis,
and  the  directives  which  are  then  distributed  from  Gosplan  (the
State  Planning  Committee)  to  the  republics,  oblasts,  rayons,
and  farms.  A  considerable  reverse  flow  of  information--
requests  for fertilizer  and  farm  machinery,  for  example--also
occurs.
*Padma  Desai  discussed  this  paper  and  the  following  paper  by
Surls.  Her  comments  and  those  of  Markish  follow  the  summary
of Surls's  paper.
12The  USSR  uses  price  incentives  to  encourage  production  and  to
assure  sales  of  particular  products  to  the  state.  While  higher
prices  are  used  to  attract  above-plan  production,  Soviet  inter-
nal  policy  dictates  that  retail  prices  for  staples  not  be  in-
creased.  Thus,  retail  price  subsidies  are  required  and  in-
creasing  Soviet  incomes  have  greatly  increased  the  desire  of
Soviet  citizens  to  upgrade  their  diet  with  meat,  dairy  products,
and  other  high-quality  foodstuffs.
The  USSR's  failure  to  meet  demand  for  such  foodstuffs  has  led
to  new  developments  in  agricultural  policy.  A new  "food
program"  is  being  implemented  in  order  to  create  an  integrated
agro-industrial  complex  to  better  coordinate  the  planning,
financing,  and  management  activities  from  farm  to  store  and  to
reduce  inefficiencies,  bottlenecks,  and  waste.
The Soviets have  also  adopted  some  changes  in  government  and
party  organization  to  improve  coordination  of  activities.  Per-
haps  most  significant,  however,  was  a  new  decree  to  encourage
production,  especially  of  meat,  on  private  plots.  Under  a
contract arrangement with state and collective  farms,  plot
holders  can  keep  many  more  animals  than  before.  The  decree  is
being  likened  to  Lenin's  new  economic  policy  of  the  twenties
in  the  encouragement  it  gives  private  agriculture.
While  the  new  5-Year  Plan  (1981-85)  for  agriculture  (the  elev-
enth)  is  more  realistic  than  the  preceding  5-Year  Plan,  it
still  seems  overly  optimistic  in  its  targets  for  grain  and  meat
production.  The  USSR  also  recognizes  the  protein  deficiency
in  their  livestock  rations,  but  has  done  poorly  in  increasing
production  of  sunflower  and  soybeans.  During  the  next  5  years,
therefore,  the  USSR  will  still  be  a  major  importer  of  grains.
If  production  goes  according  to  trend  (but  still  less  than
plan),  USSR  grain  imports  might  still  average  about  29  million
tons  per  year.  It  is  also  likely  that  the  Soviets  will  derive
the  bulk  of  their  increased  feeding  of  oilmeals  from  imports,
and  by  the  end  of  the  plan  period  they  should  be  feeding  over
8  million  tons  per  year.
As  a  result  of  the  U.S.  embargo,  the  USSR  will  probably  want  to
fill  their  grain  and oilmeal  import  requirements  from  sources
other  than  the  United  States.  Nevertheless,  even  treating  the
United  States  as  a  supplier  of  last  resort,  and  assuming  a
best  case  scenario  for  production,  the  USSR  will  still  be  a
major  purchaser  of  U.S.  products.  During  the  next  5  years,
projections  indicate  they  would  need  about  40  million  tons  of
U.S.  grain,  and,  if  USSR  harvests  are  poor,  even  more.  Imports
of  soybeans  and  meal  should  greatly  increase,  from  about  3
million  tons  (in  meal  equivalent)  over  the  past  5  years  to  as
much  as  8  million  tons,  as  the  USSR  tries  to  become  a  more  effi-
cient  feeder.  U.S.  animal  and  plant  technology  will  also
remain  attractive  products.  Thus,  even  under  a  best  case
scenario,  USSR  food  import  demand  will  remain  high  during  the
new  plan  period,  and  the  United  States  can  expect  to  participate
significantly  in  the  trade.
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by  FredericM.  Surls
Discussant:
Padma  Desai
Changes  in  domestic  economic  policy  have  been  the  major  force
behind  the  rapid  rise  in  Chinese  food  imports  since  1977.
Efforts  to  raise  living  standards  are  both  a  basic  political
commitment  of  the new leadership and  an  essential  part  of  ef-
forts  to  raise productivity throughout  China's  economy  by
providing  greater  material  incentives.
China's imports  of  food are used mainly  in  urban/industrial
areas,  where  they  supplement  government  purchases  of  food
from the countryside.  In the  case of  grains,  for  example,
while  imports  in  the  last  several  years  have  amounted  to  only
about  4 percent of  national production,  they  meet  perhaps  one-
third  of  the  requirements of China's  urban  and  industrial
population.
Food import demand  is  therefore closely  linked  to  the  supply
of,  and demand for, government supplies  of  foodstuffs.  New
policies  implemented  in  the  last  3  years  have  led  to  signifi-
cant shifts  in both supply and demand.  Demand  for  government
supplies  of  foodstuffs has increased  because  of  greater  incomes
in  the  urban/industrial  sector  of  the  economy  and  because  pop-
ulation growth  in this  sector has  been less  tightly controlled
than  in  the  past.  At  the  same  time,  government  supplies  of
food, particularly of  grains, from domestic  sources  have  shown
only limited growth despite significant  increases  in  productio-
For example, while grain production increased  by  35  million
tons  between 1977 and 1980, government  grain  purchases  increast
by only 4 to 5 million tons.  This  suggests  a  marginal  procure-
ment rate  of only  about  15  percent,  well  below  rates  in  earlier
years  for which data are available.  While  gross  procurements
grew slowly, net  procurements  of  grain  may  not  have  increased
at  all  as  resales  of  grain  by  the  government  to  areas  shifting
to  cash  crop  production  were  rising.  In  addition,  the  Govern-
ment  was  also  making  a  greater  effort  than  in  the  past  to
provide  emergency  supplies  for  areas  hit  by  natural  disasters
such as  the  1980 drought in parts  of  northern China.
Growing  demand,  slow  growth  of  procurements,  and  increased
resale to  rural  areas  have  all increased pressures on state
supplies  of  grains and other  basic foodstuffs.  A relaxation
of  constraints  on food imports was  therefore a necessary
condition for  implementing domestic economic policies.
Despite  higher  food  imports,  China is  not committed  to  inter-
national  specialization  and  rising  agricultural  imports.
Primary  interest  likely  continues  to  be  in  industrial  imports.
Export  prospects  are  uncertain,  and  attitudes  toward  debt  are
still  conservative.  Therefore,  trade  policy  appears  to  favor
holding  the  line  on  agricultural  imports.
Policy  favors  restraining  agricultural  imports  through  a  two-
stage  program  of  import  substitution.  Higher  grain  imports
permit  an  expansion  of  cash  crop  areas  and  a  gradual  reduction
in  imports  of  cotton,  sugar,  and  oilseeds.  At  the  same  time,
investment  in  areas  expected  to  produce  a  large  marketable
surplus  of  grain  will  raise  the  national  marketing  rates  as
14well  as  supplies  available  to  the  Central  Government.  This,
the  Chinese  hope,  will  prevent  further  increases  in  grain
imports.
Comments  by  Padma  Desai:  Anton  Malish's  paper  begins  with  a
brief  and  lucid  discussion  of  the  manner  in  which  the  Soviet
agricultural  production  plan  is  formulated  and,  in  particular,
the  procurement  targets  are  handed  down  to  the  farms.
The  relevant questions are:  What role  do  incentives  play  in
target  fulfillment,  and  second,  how  freely  can  farm  managers
decide  on  the  level,  structure,  and  location  of  crops  in  a
collective  farm  so  that  targets  are  fulfilled?
The role  of  incentives  in stimulating production  and  ensuring
sales  of  particular  products  has  steadily  increased  from  1965.
As  Malish  notes,  the  purchase  prices  of  agricultural  produce
have  gone  up  by  50  percent  in  the  15  years  since  then.  More
noteworthy  are  the  incentive  measures  of  the  decree  of  January
1981  aimed  at  encouraging  livestock  raising  on  private  plots.
The  ceiling  on  private  livestock  is  raised  with  the  further
provision  that  the  "fattened  livestock,  poultry,  and  milk
produced on private plots  can be  sold  to  state  and  collective
farms,  who,  when  reselling  these  products  to  the  state  procure-
ment  organizations,  can  count  these  items  in  their  plan  ful-
fillment requirements."  In  our  judgment,  this  provision  of
the  decree  fits  in  with  the  accelerating  plans  to  develop
agro-industrial  complexes  so  that  livestock  products  such  as
milk,  beef,  eggs,  and  poultry  are  produced  hygienically  and
economically  in  large-scale  production  units  rather  than  on
small private plots.
What  freedom  do  managers  have  in  farming  decisions?  It  would
seem  that  they  are  still  hemmed  in  by  many  targets  handed
down  from  higher  up  in  the  chain  of  command.  Even  if  managers
were  free  to  decide  on  crop  plantings,  structure,  and  location,
the  output  performance  in  our  judgment  would  continue  to  be
adversely  affected  by  the  fact  that  in  Soviet  practice,  each
team  (zveno)  in  the  collective  is  assigned  a  given  task  in  the
succession  of  activities  from  plowing  to  harvesting  without
being  responsible  for  the  entire  sequence  on  a  given  area  in
the  collective.  This  contrasts  with  the  Hungarian  practice  of
beznaryadnoe or the autonomous zveno,  where the  team carries
out  all tasks  from beginning to  end and is rewarded  for per-
formance.
In  his  conclusion,  Malish  forecasts  that  the  Soviet  average
grain  import  requirement  during  1981-85  will  be  29  million
tons.  The underlying assumptions  are that the USSR will switch
somewhat  from  grain  to  fodder  and  within  grain,  from  wheat  to
coarse  grain.  Other  things  being  equal,  this will  require
less  grain;  however,  this  will  be  counterbalanced  by  the  need
to  build  grain  reserves.  Since  Malish  does  not  state  the
methodology  for  the  estimates,  it  is  difficult  to  check  their
accuracy.  Also,  no  indication  is  given  of  the  possible  weather
patterns.  True,  the  USSR  has  imported  30  to  35  million  tons
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However,  these were disastrous  crop  years.  From that  perspec-
tive,  annual imports  at  29 million  tons may  turn out  to  be  a
bit on  the high side.
I shall restrict my comments on Frederic Surls'  paper to  two
areas.  It  seems  that  in the coming years  China will  emerge as
a leading  importer of  wheat and  a  substantial  importer of
soybeans  and, perhaps, of  cotton.  Given China's  conservative
foreign debt policies, it would be  instructive  to know what
proportion of  foreign exchange earnings will be  used in the
near future by these imports.  Second, with rising procurement
prices and fixed prices  to  consumers, the subsidy rises  from
year to year.  One wonders  about  the current  cost  of  this
subsidy to the state  budget.
Comments by Yuri Markish:  The USSR does  not appear  to  be
planning the significant increases  in agricultural investment
needed to  overcome  the severe deficiencies  in soils.  Most USSR
agricultural soils are low in natural fertility;  about 55  per-
cent  of  them are deficient  in mobile  (active) phosphorus.
Poor farming techniques  in fertile  areas such as  the  Ukraine
have  reduced yields  there.  Weed and  insect  infestation is
spreading and vast territories now harbor  long-term diseases or
suffer from wind and water erosion.  Soviet fertilizers  have
poor  soil mobility, and  carelessness in distribution and
application further  reduce their benefits.  Half  of  the grain
crop receives  no fertilizer at  all.  The  USSR has  little
capability  in  state enterprises  for increasing production of
the high-technology fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides
necessary  to increase yields.  Therefore, the new developments
in agricultural policy, the  "food program" and organizational
changes,  for example,  are unlikely  to  result in significant
output  increases without  a radical  redirection in Soviet
priorities.  Even then, it would take  decades  to  bring about
an improvement  in soils  and develop  the needed infrastructure
in remote areas.
Accordingly, though  the USSR might prefer to  buy from other
sources,  they will  likely return  to  the  U.S. market  since it
offers  large volumes of  high-quality produce, which can be
transported  cheaply and efficiently, at  reasonable prices.
16,£ 4 ERNAL  POLICY,  DECISIONS,  AND  FOOD  IMPORT  DEMAND  IN  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
Food  Imports,  Gov-
ernment  Policy,  and
the  Balance  of
Payments:  The  Case
of  Wheat  in  Egypt
by  Grant  M.  Scobie
and  Alberto  Valdes
Discussant:
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In  a  number  of  developing  countries,  food  imports  constitute
a  significant  share  of  total  import  expenditures.  The  types  of
commercial  and  exchange  rate  policies  that  are  pursued  often
result  in  a  chronic  shortage  of  foreign  exchange.  Limited  sup-
plies  of  foreign  exchange  have  to  be  administratively  allocated
to  competing  classes  of  imports.  The  amount  of  food  imported,
usually  by  a  state  trading  authority  having  exclusive  rights  to
foreign  trade,  depends  on  the  strength  of  a  country's  external
account  and  the  balance  of  payment  adjustment  mechanism.
Further,  the  level  of  those  food  imports  will  depend  on  the
domestic  policies  which  the  government  uses  to  influence  produc-
tion  and  consumption.
These  features  are  combined  in  an  econometric  model  of  Egyptian
wheat  imports.  Egyptian  Government  policies  are  represented
by  three  key  instruments:  the  size  of  the  subsidy  to  domestic
wheat  consumers,  the  size  of  the  tax  or  subsidy  between  produc-
ers  and  consumers, and  the  tax on cotton  exports.  The  latter
is  important  as  cotton  production  competes  with  wheat.  A  rise
in the  cotton tax would tend  to  encourage  wheat  output  at  the
expense  of  cotton  while  reducing  wheat  imports.  Further,  cotton
traditionally  has  been  a  major  source  of  export  revenue,  so  that
Egypt's  command  over  foreign  goods  and  services,  including  wheat,
is  partly  determined  by  the  amount  of  cotton  exported.  Wheat
shipments under concessionary terms have  been  both  important  and
variable  in Egypt;  they are  included explicitly  in  the  model.
Egypt  has  subsidized  the  domestic  consumption  of  bread  for
nearly  four  decades.  The  size  of  that  subsidy  and  its  cost  to
the  treasury  grew  dramatically  in  the  seventies.  The  study
finds  that  the  elasticity  of  transmission  between  changes  in
real  world  and  domestic  prices  of  wheat  is  rather  high  (about
0.5).  While  consumers  have  been  insulated  from  some  of  the
year-to-year  variability  in  the  world  prices,  trends  in  those
prices  have  been  reflected  in  the  domestic  price.  The  fall  in
the  real  world  wheat  price  in  the  late  seventies  was  directly
transmitted  to  Egyptian  consumers  where  the  real  domestic
price  fell  markedly,  accounting  for  much  of  the  rise  in  con-
sumption  and  imports.
Largely  because  of  the  political  importance  of  the  consumer
subsidy,  the  import  elasticity  of  demand  for  wheat  is  low.
This  is  true  for  both  foreign  exchange  and  the  world  price.  A
rise  in  the  supply  of  foreign  exchange  has  a  very  limited  im-
pact  on  wheat  imports;  the  marginal  propensity  to  spend  on  im-
ported  wheat  out  of  foreign  exchange  is  low.  For  this  reason
a  compensatory  financial  scheme  such  as  the  "food  facility"
introduced  by  the  International  Monetary  Fund  is  likely  to
have  little  impact  on  the  imports  and  domestic  consumption  of
wheat  in  Egypt.
On  the  other  hand,  because  of  the  relatively  low  response  of
wheat  imports  to  world  prices,  the  quantity  of  imported  wheat
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is  maintained  through  drawing  down  reserves  of  foreign  exchange
increasing  foreign  borrowing,  or  through  reducing  the  imports
of  other  commodities  such  as  raw  materials  and  capital  goods.
Egypt's  food  policies  have  a  potentially  destabilizing  effect
on  output  and  employment  in  the  nonfarm  sector  through  their
impact  on  the  level  and  consumption  of  imports.  Consequently,
the  "food  facility"  may  acquire  its  greatest  benefits  through
enhancing  the  stability  of  imports  of  raw  materials  and  capital
equipment  and  encouraging  faster  and  more  consistent  growth  in
the  nonfarm  sector.
Comments  by  G.  Edward  Schuh:  Economists  need  to  specify  formal
behavioral  models  of  the  governmental  sector  rather  than  ad  hoc
specifications  of  policy  formulation.  The  paper  by  Scobie  and
Valdes  is better  than most  in meeting this  need.  It  is  possible
to  think  in  terms  of  a  demand  for  policy  and  a  supply  of  policy.
Although  policy  determinants  are  implicit,  there  is  a  need  to
capture  these  somehow  in  models  of  underlying  government  behav-
ior.  A  number  of  other points raised  in  the  paper  need  clari-
fication  or  elaboration.  First,  results  showed  serial  correla-
tion  in  the  residuals,  the  implications  of  which  need  to  be
examined  more  thoroughly.  Second,  the  authors  observe  that
IMF  funding  would  be  used  to  finance  nonfood  imports.  This
observation is  important  and  deserves more  emphasis.  Finally,
the  distinction  between  degree  of  protection  and  degree  of
insulation  needs  to  be  pursued.
General  discussion:  Comments  focused  on  the  IMF  food  import
facility and on modeling government policy.  Josling  pointed
out  that  the  IMF  facility  was  not  just  a  food  import  cost
facility.  Pearson  recommended  looking  at  the  earlier  literature
of  Hollis  Chenery  and  others.  Lattimore  questioned  the  use  of
the ratio of  the world price of  wheat  to  the  world  price  of
cotton  to  specify  the  exchange  rate.
The middle-income developing  countries  are of  interest  in  inter-
national  grain  trade  because  they  include  countries  which  are
newly  emerging  cash markets  for  agricultural  exports  as  well
as  well-established  markets.
The  middle-income  developing  countries  are  by  no  means  a  homo-
geneous  group.  They  include Sudan,  Egypt,  and  Indonesia  on  the
low  end  of  the  GNP  scale  and  the  Republic  of  Korea,  Taiwan,
and  Venezuela  on  the  high  end.  Some  of  these  countries  have
experienced  particularly  rapid  increases  in  grain  imports
since  the  midseventies  following  OPEC  petroleum  price  increases.
sOthers  have  increased  grain  imports  because  of  available  sup-
plies  of  gifts  and  concessionary  sales.  There  are  also  regional
differences  in  production  and  consumption  of  grains.
Government  policies  that  intervene  in  the  pricing  and  marketing
of  grains  are  important  tools  used  by  middle-income  developing
countries  to  protect  consumers  from  high  prices  and  to  promote
wheat  production.  Consumer  prices  are  subsidized  in  many  of
these  countries.  Several  countries  also  operate  two-tiered
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grains  than  equivalent  consumer  prices.  The  result  of  such
intervention  is  that,  with  exceptions  of  Taiwan,  Chile,  and
Venezuela,  state  trading  and/or  restrictive  licensing  arrange-
ments  are  required  for  grain  importation  among  middle-income
developing  countries.
To  analyze  the  influence  of  supply  and  demand  factors  that
affect  grain  imports,  net  import  demand  functions,  as  described
by  Abbot,  were  fitted  to  cross-section  data  for  20  middle-
income  developing  countries  from  1976  to  1979.  Functions  were
estimated  for  rice,  wheat,  and  corn  imports.  Countries  were
separated  into  wheat-producing  and  nonproducing  categories
for  the  wheat  import  demand  estimation.  Inclusion  of  variables
in  the  estimated  equations  was  on  the  basis  of  traditional
supply and demand theory.
Results  of  regression  by  ordinary  least  squares  suggest  that
foreign  exchange  earnings,  the  level  of  production  and  stocks,
and population growth are the most  important  factors  which
affect  grain  imports  among  middle-income  developing  countries.
In  addition,  increased  commercial  livestock  and  poultry  produc-
tion is  an  important  determinant  of  import  demand  for  corn.
The  results  of  this  analysis  also  indicate  that  government
intervention  in  pricing,  marketing,  and  trade  is  important  in
determining  import  levels,  and  that  movements  in  international
prices  do  not  significantly  affect  import  demand.
Comments by Colin Carter:  Most of  the  participants  at  this
meeting  have  agreed  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  estimate  grain
import demand relationships.  However, Cathy Jabara has  been
ambitious  enough  to  attempt  to  do  so.
The  objective  of  her  paper  is  to  estimate  net  import  demand
functions  for  wheat,  corn,  and  rice  for  middle-income  countries
by  combining  cross-sectional  and  time-series  data.  This  is  an
important  relationship  for  us  to  understand,as  these  importing
countries  account  for  approximately  40  percent  of  U.S.  exports
of  wheat,  rice,  and  coarse  grains.
An initial comment,  which is  related  to  our discussion yester-
day,  is  that  this  paper  is  not  tied  in  with  previous  work  in
the area.  A review of  related empirical work would have been
useful  not  only  as  background  information  but  also  to  serve  in
support  of  the  particular  functional  form  chosen  in  this  paper.
The  introductory  and  concluding  comments  in  the  paper  argue
that  the  formation  of  OPEC  resulted  in  foreign  exchange  short-
ages  and  consequently  strained  grain  import  levels.  Also,  a
further  distinction  is  made  between  those  countries  which  ex-
port  primary  products  from those  which  do  not.  It  is  then
stated  that  those  countries  which  export  manufactures  rather
than  primary  products  have  been  affected  by  OPEC  prices  on  a
larger  scale.  This  statement  is  not  empirically  supported  in
the  paper.  In  fact,  the  estimated  coefficients  show  foreign
exchange  to  be  more  of  a  constraint  in  wheat-producing  countries
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since  about  40  percent  of  the  wheat-producing  countries  export
petroleum.
One important conclusion of  this paper  is  that  income  is  not  a
significant  factor  explaining  wheat  import  demand.  What  then
explains why our  exports to  these countries  have  grown  so
rapidly?  Can  it  all  be  due  to  population  growth?  There  is
possibly a multicollinearity problem between  income  and  popu-
lation.
Two demand  equations for wheat and one  each  for  rice  and  corn
are estimated in this paper.  The own  price  variable  is  statis-
tically  insignificant  in  all  four  equations  and  is  of  the  wrong
sign  in  three  of  the  equations.  These  price  relationships  are
a bit of  a mystery.  One explanation worth  further  inquiry  is
that  exchange  rate  changes  may  have  masked  the  effect  of  the
price changes measured in U.S.  dollars.
In  conclusion, the empirical results  of  this  paper  are  far  from
being  statistically  powerful.  They  do  not  do  a  good  job  of  ex-
plaining  recent  demand  growth  and,  unfortunately,  do  not  help  us
in understanding  the extent of  future growth  of  grain  imports.
General  discussion:  Explanation  of  the  sources  of  growth  in
the import demand of middle-income countries  dominated  the
discussion.  Magiera noted that income  was  a  significant  factor
in explaining import demand in a study  of  50  countries.  He
suggested  that  concentrating  only  on  middle-income  developing
countries probably does not allow for  large  enough  variations
in  income  to  capture  the  effect.  Bredahl  observed  that  similar
methods used for forecasting  in the seventies  consistently
underestimated  demand.  Countries  with  rapidly  expanding  popu-
lation and income, such as Mexico, are  experiencing  increases
in per  capita consumption of grains.  Therefore,  it  is  crucial
to  analyze per  capita changes in demand.  Bredahl  also  suggested
that  foreign exchange  limitations are not  significant because
of  the  liberal policies  of  the  United  States and  Canada in
guaranteeing  bank  loans  for  grain  purchases.  Valdes  and  Magiera
thought  the  analysis was dominated  by policies  and practices
of  certain countries.  Indonesia's  policy and practice would
tend  to dominate  the  results  for rice and  Egypt's policy and
practice  for  wheat.  Valdes  felt  that  Jabara's  single  equation
approach  was  difficult  to  justify,  and  Desai  suggested  the
use  of  different  functional  forms  (for  example,  log-linear
as  well  as  linear)  to  conduct  the  analysis  of  import  demand.
Growth  of  Agricul-  The  rapid  industrialization  of  South  Korea  since  the midsixties
tural  Protectionism  has  been  accompanied  by  considerable  growth  in  agricultural
in  South  Korea:  production.  Agricultural  trade  and  domestic  agricultural  price'
Trade  and  Welfare  have  been  heavily  influenced  and  often  fully  determined  by  gov-
Effects  ernment  policies  in  these  years.  This  paper  first  examines  the
extent  to  which  those  policies  have  caused  producer  and  consumer
by  Kym  Anderson  prices  of  agricultural  products  in  South  Korea  to  differ  from
prices  at  the  country's  border  over  the  past  25  years.  It  then
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uses  the  comparison  data  to  estimate  empirically  the  effects
of  those  policies,  as  compared  with  free  market  policies,  on
the  country's  agricultural  trade  and  economic  welfare  in  the
late  seventies  and,  should  present  policies  continue,  in  1990.
The  extent  of  growth  in  agricultural  protection  in  South  Korea
is  as  rapid  as,  and  not  far  behind,  that  in  Japan,  and  the  per
capita  welfare  effects  of  this  protection  in  the  late  seventies
appeared  to  be  almost  as  great  as  in  Japan  and  greater  than  in
the  European  Economic  Community  (EEC).  The  paper  concludes
with  some  suggested  alternatives  to  present  policies  that
could  more  efficiently  achieve  the  stated  objectives  of  boost-
ing both  farm  incomes  and  food  security  and,  at  the  same  time,
improving  the  welfare  of  domestic  consumers  and  overseas
producers.
Comments  by  John  H.  Dyck:  Agricultural  protectionism  always
entails  costs  for  an  economy,  particularly  for  one  with  a  growth
strategy  based  on  the  export  of  manufactured  goods.  Anderson
demonstrates  this  quite  well  for  Korea,  and  provides  valuable
quantitative  measures  of  welfare  effects  that  aid  in  assessing
the  importance  of  protectionism's  effects  there.  While  South
Korea  is,  in  itself,  an  important  market,  its  protection  of  food
grain  and  livestock  production  is  typical  in  varying  degrees
of  other Asian countries, and Anderson's  critical  examination
of  agricultural  policies  should  be  of  interest  for  those  coun-
tries 'as  well.
The paper undertakes the difficult task  of  comparing  products
and  prices  within  and  outside  Korea,  and  necessarily  performs  a
partial  equilibrium  analysis  with  some  simplifying  assumptions,
all  clearly  stated  in  the  paper.  Without  finding  fault  with
this  approach,  there  are  some  aspects  of  the  analysis  which
might better be  done differently.
Examination  of  Korean  preferences  for  various  types  of  rice,
beef,  and  other  commodities  may  be  important  empirically.
Calculation  of  rates  of  protection  is  possible  by  use  of  closer
substitutes  for  domestic  Korean  products  than  Anderson  uses,
California medium-grain rice and Australian boneless  beef,  for
example.  Results  of  such  calculations  suggest  that  his  paper
overestimates protection of  rice and underestimates protection
of  beef.  This  kind  of  examination  might  also  sometimes  show
a greater impact  on prices  than would a  look at  all  types  of
the  commodity  together.  This  could  be  the  case  concerning  the
Koreans'  trade  barriers.  The  increased  demand  for  this  rice
might  increase  prices  considerably,  and  thus  nullify  some  of
the  advantage  that  Korean  consumers  might  expect  to  gain  from
reduced  protection  of  domestic  agriculture.
The  paper's  projections  to  1990  rest  on  the  assumption  of  un-
changed  trends  and  prices.  This  is  a  legitimate  assumption,
but  unrealistic  enough  that  Anderson's  discussion  of  the  effect
of  Korea's  protectionism  on  exporting  nations  (that  is,  the
United  States  and  Australia)  and  the  tentative  conclusion  that
both  are  hurt  may  be  premature.  Whether  the  United  States
stands  to  gain  or  lose  overall  depends  greatly  on  the  growth
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stuffs.  In  this  connection,  the  rapid  changes  in  technology
and  size  of  operation  of  the  pork  and  poultry  industries  may
make  extrapolations  from  conditions  in  the  seventies  to  the
year  1990  inappropriate.
General discussion:  Lattimore asked  about  the  impact  of  the
end  of  concessionary  grain  sales  to  Korea  in  1981  and  its  effect
on  the  policy  process.  Anderson  pointed  out  that  Korean  leaders
had  long  known  that  such  sales  would  end,  and  that  they  might
now  attempt  to  diversify  their  sources  of  supply.  Anderson
responded  to  specific  comments  by  Dyck.  Separating  the  beef
and  dairy  sectors  from  the  pork  and  poultry  ones  may  well  show
a  turnaround  in  the  comparative  advantage  of  the  latter.  As
to  why  Korea  has  changed  its  policy,  Anderson  stressed  real
wage  changes  which  accompanied  the  overflow  of  farmers  and
agricultural  laborers  in  urban  jobs.  Real  wages  increased  at
the  rate  of  30  percent  per  year  when  migration  was  at  its
peak.
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Bilateral  Agree-
ments  as  a  Response
to  Emerging  Inter-
national  Market
Conditions




The  recent  interest  in  bilateral  agreements  in  the  United  States
has  its  origins  in  conditions  that  developed  in  the  early  seven-
ties.  World  markets  expanded  rapidly  and  longstanding  excess
reserves  of  major  traded  commodities  disappeared.  Large-scale
purchasing  by  the  Soviet  Union  and  a  number  of  other  countries
in  1973  resulted  in  sharp  price  increases  that  stimulated  a
broad-based  interest  by  consumers  and  other  groups  in  stabili-
zation  of  U.S.  food  and  commodity  prices.  The  Soviet  purchases
were  singled  out  as  a  direct  cause  of  the  sharp  price  changes;
the  United  States  responded  by  seeking  a  bilateral  arrangement
that  would  help  to  moderate  the  unpredictability  of  these
purchases and their impact  on the market.
A  conceptual  evaluation  of  the  impact  of  bilateral  agreements
on  world  markets  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  under  certain
conditions  bilateral  agreements  will  tend  to  increase  market
instability.  This occurs if  both prices  and  quantities  are
rigidly  fixed  and  instability  is  exacerbated,  as  a  larger  pro-
portion of  the market is  tied up in bilaterals.  If  only  quan-
tities  are  fixed  the  degree  of  price  instability  will  be  deter-
mined by operating practices of  countries  that participate in
bilateral  arrangements.  The  most  important  objective  sought
by countries that  enter into bilateral agreements  is  to  stabi-
lize  quantities  traded.  Importers  want  to  assure  supplies,  and
exporters  want  assured  demand  for  their  product.  In  either
case,  the  extent  to  which  this  objective  can  be  achieved  depends
on  the  degree  of  coverage  of  traded  quantities  and  the  flexi-
bility afforded  by  the  terms  of  the  agreement.  Neither  import-
ers  nor exporters can achieve full stability  in  supplies  or
outlets  unless  their total needs  or shipments  are  covered  by
inflexible  arrangements  on  specific  quantity.  Short  of  this,
competitive  bidding  to  displace  either  purchases  by  the
importer,  sales  by  the  importer,  or  sales  by  the  exporter  is  a
possibility.
In  terms  of  existing market and  institutional  relationships,  it
can  be  concluded  that  it  is  possible  to  achieve  the  following
through  international  bilateral  agreements:
1.  Importers  can  achieve  a  measure  of  supply  assurance
through  bilateral  agreements  by  negotiating  a  predeter-
mined  and guaranteed import  level with an  exporter or
group  of  exporters.  No  individual  importer  dominates
the  market  enough  to  make  this  an  infeasible  objective.
2.  All  exporters  except  the  United  States  are  small  enough  in
the  market  and,  in  most  cases,  have  sufficient  control  over
market  transactions  to  seek  a  substantial  level  of  demand
assurance  through  bilateral  agreements.  The  primary
constraint on the negotiated level of demand assurance
is  that  most  exporting  countries  are  subject  to  supply
variability,  and  the  quantities  negotiated  would  have  to  be
23within  a  range  that  permits  adjustment  to  weather-induced
variations  in  output.
3.  Given current world and U.S.  domestic  market  characteris-
tics,  complete,  or  even  substantial,  coverage  of  U.S.  exports
through bilaterals  is clearly impossible.  As  a  residual
supplier,  there  is no  assurance  that  the  United  States  can
achieve either quantity or  price stabilization through
bilateral  agreements.  The  U.S.  domestic  marketing  system
is not  suited  to  accommodate large-scale government  supply
commitments  to  international  bilateral  arrangements.
Aside  from the direct  implications for  market  stabilization,  a
number  of  other  factors  need  to  be  taken  into  account  in
evaluating  the  prospects  for,  and  implications  of,  bilateral
arrangements.  One  major  implication  is  the  impact  on  non-
participating  countries, particularly developing  nations.  If
the  major  trading  nations  enter  into  agreements  to  cover  normal
levels  of  trade,  then  nonparticipating  buying  and  selling
countries  will  be  forced  into  the  more  volatile  and  unstable
residual  market.  Bilateral  arrangements  can  also  have  a  direct
effect  on  U.S.  consumers  and  farmers  by  exacerbating  shifting
relationships  between  livestock  and  grain  prices.
Another  important  issue  is  market  control.  Aggressive  entry
into  bilateral  arrangements  requires  government  control  of  both
domestic  and  international  marketing  beyond  that  which  exists
or  is  likely to  be acceptable to U.S.  commercial  agricultural
interests.  To  date,  the  United  States  has  entered  into  several
bilateral  understandings  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  products,
ranging  from  those  which  do  not  have  the  force  of  agreement  nor
any  supply assurance to  those with somewhat  more  formalized
arrangements.
A  final issue  is the relationship between bilaterals  and other
U.S.  policies.  Extensive  entry  into  bilateral  arrangements
would be inconsistent with the  basic long-term U.S.  objective
of  seeking  multilateral  reductions  in  trade  barriers  and  an
open  world  trading  system.
It  is  likely that the most promising use  of bilaterals for  the
United  States  is  in  conjunction  with market  development  pro-
grams.  These  could  be  short  term  and  aimed  at direct  promotion
of  consumption  in  importing  countries,  or  they  could  be  long
term  and  aimed  at  stimulating  agricultural  and  industrial
development  within  importing  countries  with  a  view  toward  long-
term  expansion  of  food  import  needs  associated  with  income
growth.  This  approach  involves  a  much  closer  linkage  than
currently  exists  between  those  government  officials  and  private
organizations  concerned  with  export  market  promotion  and  those
concerned  with  economic  development.
Comments  by  Jimmye  Hillman:  The  paper  by  Nuttall  and  Sorenso.
calls  attention  to  one  of  the  most  prevalent  institutional  forms
of  trade  arrangements  extant.  While  bilateral  arrangements
have  not  been  historically  a  major  device  in  the  U.S.  arsenal,
24this  country,  because  of  economic  and  political  determinisms,
is  being boxed into an accommodation with  other  countries  in
that  respect.  The  United  States,  in  short,  can  no  longer
ignore  bilateralism,  though  the  methods  of  implementing  agree-
ments  will  vary  with  its  trading  partners.
Nuttall  and  Sorenson  have  recorded  the  developments  surrounding
bilateral  arrangements during  recent years.  Portions  of  their
analytical  framework  relating  to  the  agreements  are,  however,
somewhat  flawed.  Little  argument  can  be  raised  with  such  obser-
vations as:  (1) major constraints  still  impede  U.S.  agricultural
export  flows,  (2)  an  increasing  portion  of  agricultural  trade
is  outside  the  traditional  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and
Trade (GATT) negotiating procedures and  can  be  dealt  with
only  through country-by-country negotiations,  and  (3)  major
U.S. competitors  exercise close government  control  over  trading
relationships.
The  following  questions  may  be  raised  about  the  above.  If
major  trade  constraints  remain,  are  bilateral  arrangements  the
only,  or  the  optimum,  mechanism  to  overcome  them?  Bilateralism
raises  a  new  set  of  constraints  built  around  the  multiplied
bureaucracies which must be set up to  deal  with  the  many  one-on-
one  situations  which  arise..  Second,  just  because  "major  compe-
titors  do  it,"  is  that  rational  or  efficient  justification  for
the  United  States  to  follow  suit?  Finally,  aren't  bilateral
agreements  inherently  and  demonstrably  unstable?  This  is
implied  by  the  shrinking  of  residual  markets  (those  outside  the
bilateral arrangements) and the presumed  decreasing  elasticities
of  supply  and  demand,  coupled  with  the  instability  of  an
increased  portion  of  trade  that  is  tied  to  politics.  Moreover,
it  is  unrealistic  to  attach  significant  meaning  to  the  price
factor,  which  is  based  on  the  residual  market,  when  a  large
share  of  total  world  supplies  is  tied  to  bilateral  agreements.
(Witness  the  sugar  situation  in  the  early  seventies.)  It  is
refreshing  that  the  authors  come  to  this  conclusion,  though
there is  a flaw in the  presentation.
The  flaw  in  analytic  methodology  lies  in  the  general  thesis  or
presentation that residual  demand and supply curves become more
inelastic  as  bilateral  quantities  are  tied  up  in  one-on-one
country  arrangements.  The  authors  are  encouraged  to  reconsider
their  methodology  and  reconstruct  the  analysis  with  corrections.
Despite  the  flaw,  the  final  portion  of  the  paper  comes  to  the
proper  conclusions  relative  to:
1.  Stability--Bilaterals  increase  price  instability.
2.  Market  development--Small  country  suppliers  and  consumers
can  use  bilaterals  more  effectively  than  large  ones.




and  Food  Import
Demand
by  Daniel  T.  Morrow
Discussant:
Robert  L.  Thompson
General discussion:  Comments  revealed disagreements on  the
effects  of  bilateral agreements  on world commodity trade.
Morrow and  Siamwalla disagreed  that bilateral agreements  do
not affect the equilibrium price.  Morrow argued  that  bilat-
eral  agreements will merely change  trade flows without  affect-
ing prices  or  total world trade since  importers  can re-export
excess  supplies.  Finally, Morrow felt  that  bilateral agree-
ments tend  to increase the sense  of  insecurity  about  the  avail-
ability of world grain supplies, resulting  in increased demand
for additional  agreements.
This paper  reviews  several ways  in which stockholding of  grain,
by  the world as  a whole or by individual  countries, might
influence longrun and  shortrun import demand.
A  strong theoretical argument  can be made that  the  pattern of
world  grain stockholding, through its  impact  on the  degree of
world price variability, can have  an impact  on the  longrun
demand for  imports.  After reviewing the  theoretical  relation-
ships between patterns of  stockholding and  price variability,
the  paper develops  the  hypothesis that  price  variability in the
world grain market has  a "ratchet effect"  on effective rates  of
protection  of  the  grain markets  in importing countries, and,
thus,  tends  to depress  import demand  in the long  run.  If
true, exporting countries  as  well as  importing countries would
have an interest in greater world price stability.
Although the empirical relationship between the  level  of  stock-
holding and world price variability can be  reasonably well
established for wheat, as  summarized in the  paper, convincing
evidence has not  been found for  such a ratchet  effect.  The
paper reviews  the pattern  of domestic support  prices  for wheat
from 1963 to  1977  for 30 countries,  but concludes  that  this pro-
vides no strong evidence  that  the  price  variability in  the
early  seventies induced permanent real increases  in domestic
support  levels.  This  illustrates  the  difficulty of investigat-
ing longer run  changes  in the  structure of  the world trading
system.
The paper also considers  three general propositions about  the
effects  of  stockholding decisions  on year-to-year  changes in
import demand.  First,  few importing  countries should use
interyear stockholding rather than  imports  to help  stabilize
their domestic grain consumption.  The paper  summarizes four
circumstances  in which such stockholding would be justified,
noting that more research in  this area  is needed  to avoid
simplistic and incorrect advice to  importing countries on re-
serve  stock policies.  Second, among  those few countries which
might justifiably hold interyear stocks,  there are  only a
few--the Soviet Union, India with respect to wheat, Indonesia
with respect to  rice, and China--whose grain economies are
large  enough so  that  their changes  in stocks and changes in
import  demand have any noticeable impact on the world  grain
markets as a whole.  More research  on the stockholding behavior
of  these countries  is  needed.  Regarding the Soviet Union, it
is  noted  that  the  unwillingness  to  provide  data  on  its  stock
26levels not only  imposes a  cost on the  rest  of  the  world  but
may also have  disadvantages for  the  Soviet  Union,  since  major
exporters may not  correctly anticipate needs  and  adjust  their
own stocks accordingly.  In short, the  Soviet  Union  may  have
to  give up some of  its  ability to  take  the  world  market  by
surprise in order to  enhance the  reliability  of  that  market.
A  third general observation presented in  the  paper  is  that,  in
a situation of  very tight world markets  and  high  prices,
importing countries as  a whole may be  induced  to  undertake
stockholding  as  some  protection  against  the  risk  that  future
opportunities  to  trade may be restricted  by  export  controls.
The  possibility  of  such  a  panic  market  is  worth  understanding
and  trying  to  prevent.
Comments  by  Robert  L.  Thompson:  This  paper  sets  the  stage  for
determining the relationship between stocks  and  import  demand.
The two  are closely related.  Morrow argues  that  high  prices
may increase  protection through a ratchet  effect,  but  there  is
no empirical test of  this hypothesis.  Rather  than  look  at  the
percentage  change  in the national support  price,  the  percentage
change in net  protection might be more  useful.  The  ratchet
effect  may  not  be  the  only  mechanism  by  which  protection  in-
creases.  There is a need  to  explain better  the  policy  process
which determines stock levels, as Morrow  indicates,  but  the
welfare effect  is  important.  Although  the  welfare  gains  from
price  instability  are  small,  the  income  transfers  are  large.
General discussion:  Morrow agreed that  the  market  effect  is  not
the only mechanism by which protection increases,  but  stressed
that  it  is  the mechanism by which policy  is  made.  He  agreed
with Thompson's  comments  about income transfers,  but  stated  that
the biggest  transfer in  the United States  occurs  within  the
Government  budget.
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